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ABSTRACT: One very common style of teaching philosophy involves 
remaining publicly neutral regarding the views being debated—a technique 
commonly styled ‘teaching the debate.’ This paper seeks to survey evidence 
from the literature in social psychology that suggests teaching the debate 
naturally lends itself to student skepticism toward the philosophical views 
presented. In contrast, research suggests that presenting one’s own views 
alongside teaching the debate in question—or ‘engaging the debate’—can 
effectively avoid eliciting skeptical attitudes among students without 
sacrificing desirable pedagogical outcomes. Thus, there are good reasons to 
engage philosophical debates as an educator, not merely teach them.  
 
 
 In a sequence of lectures delivered while visiting Rome, the Academic skeptic 
Carneades is said to have scandalized his audience by first persuasively arguing in favor of 
the value of justice and on the next day persuasively arguing against the value of justice. 
Carneades was ‘teaching the debate.’ At least during Carneades’s tenure at the Academy, 
the practice of arguing both for and against a view was implicitly oriented toward eliciting 
an attitude of mitigated skepticism. Contemporary philosophy lecturers may not intend to 
produce the same mitigated skepticism amongst their students, but in this paper, I will 
argue that there is good reason to believe some variety of philosophical skepticism is an 
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undesirable consequence of a standard way of teaching philosophy courses. However, as I 
will also argue, this consequence can be avoided without sacrificing desirable educational 
outcomes, by not just teaching but engaging the content of the debate in a personal way. 
Following the example of Carneades, I will focus especially on styles of teaching courses 
in ethics, though much of what I have to say also applies to other philosophy courses. 
I begin with some assumptions. First, I assume that most philosophers have 
considered views on the subject they are teaching. In other words, I assume a majority of 
philosophers are not personally philosophical skeptics. This appears to be a safe 
assumption, at least with respect to ethics. According to the Philpapers survey data 
(Bourget and Chalmers 2014), most philosophers are moral realists and cognitivists about 
moral judgment. And philosophers as a group are closely split between deontological, 
consequentialist, and virtue-ethics approaches (with a sizeable group adhering to some 
further theory). In brief, most lecturers in ethics have more or less settled views on 
normative theory, and by extension, have more or less settled views on the various cases 
that tend to arise given the standard selection of readings in typical ethics courses (e.g. 
pushing the fat man, abortion, ‘Singer’s solution,’ etc.).  
Partially based upon this first assumption, I also assume that most philosophers do 
not intend to produce in their ethics students largely agnostic attitudes toward the subject. 
Put differently, I assume lecturers don’t wish to see their students completing an ethics 
course more at a loss as to what to say about morality than before they began. That is, we 
don’t want to be fiducially corrosive, eroding or eliminating confidence in reasonable 
moral beliefs. Though it is strictly-speaking not a form of attitudinal agnosticism, I will 
classify moral relativism as broadly falling within the tent of agnostic views that most 
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lecturers do not wish to see instilled in their students upon completion of an ethics class. 
For present purposes, I understand moral relativism to be the view that moral judgments 
are subjectively-determined, that is made true by an individual’s beliefs, preferences, 
desires and so on, and consequently ‘true’ only for that individual (and whoever shares the 
relevant features of that individual’s subjective state, such as fellow members of a culture). 
It is important to note that the second assumption is not that most lecturers intend to dispel 
agnostic attitudes, such that one of their desired educational outcomes is a relatively more 
confident belief in some normative theory (or particular normative propositions) than 
before a student began the class. I am confident that some do have that educational 
outcome. But my second assumption is weaker, namely that a relative increase in agnostic 
attitudes among students completing an ethics course is not a desirable educational 
outcome in the minds of most teachers. It is thus a desideratum of teaching philosophy to 
avoid increases in agnostic attitudes among students.  
The third assumption is more banal, but nonetheless important to set out. That is, a 
second educational desideratum is that students become knowledgeable on the theses and 
arguments considered central by most contemporary philosophers working in ethics. In 
brief, I assume that we philosophers as a group have more or less settled views in ethics 
and, in the course of learning about a range of plausible moral views (and arguments in 
their favor), we wish our ethics students to feel rationally comfortable coming to their own 
moral conclusions—or, at least, for students to have a deepened understanding of plausible 
theoretical explanations for the substantive moral conclusions they maintained throughout 
the duration of the course. This is not to say that the average philosopher thinks every moral 
conclusion a student may come to is equally rational. We have our own settled views, after 
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all. But we simply don’t wish to dogmatically insist upon students coming to the same 
moral conclusions we have ourselves endorsed. Such dogmatism would be unphilosophical 
and thus counterproductive.  
Now that I have canvassed some central assumptions, I turn to outline one 
plausibly-common way ethics courses may be taught, arguing that there is good reason to 
believe that this approach veers too strongly away from the Scylla of dogmatism, 
inadvertently plunging many students into the Charybdis of agnosticism—an undesirable 
educational goal, according to previous assumptions. After making a case against this 
approach, I will turn to present an alternative that is capable of maintaining the same 
educational outcomes I assume are intended, while at the same time steering a middle 
course that avoids both dogmatism and agnosticism.  
The first approach to consider is one where a lecturer essentially takes himself out 
of the picture: presenting views and arguments while carefully avoiding tipping his hand 
and revealing his own personal views on the course content. It is the role of an impartial 
narrator. I will call this approach ‘teaching the debate’ for obvious reasons. As previously 
suggested, Carneades appears to have been teaching the debate. For, rather than publicly 
pick a side and explain his reasons for supporting it against rival views, Carneades 
advocated for both sides and thus took his own informed perspective out of the educational 
environment, as it were. In much the same way, contemporary lecturers who teach the 
debate do so by treating both sides of covered debates with approximately equal sympathy, 
arguing first in favor of, say, the hedonic calculus, and then against it and in favor, say, of 
Kantian rationalism. Students who look to their professor for cues on how to weigh the 
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various sides of the debate and come to some rational normative conclusion will find little 
more than a philosophical chameleon.  
My suspicion is that there are a few motivations for a professor’s remaining 
publicly neutral in the classroom between the various views. The first is that, in remaining 
neutral, they will appear less biased and thus more objectively rational—an appearance 
desirable for its own sake but also because it may allay student concerns about biased 
grading as well as provide a model for students to follow as they consider rival views. The 
second rationale may be that professors do not wish to cloud the rational judgment of 
students by inclining them in favor of the theory or conclusion the professor himself has 
endorsed—the thought being that the strongest argument should prevail, not the professor’s 
own voiced view. In other words, the lecturer wishes to avoid the faintest hints of 
dogmatism. A potential third rationale is that some lecturers lack confidence in their own 
normative judgments (theoretical or concrete) and consequently feel squeamish publicly 
advocating for their mere intellectual leanings toward one view when they are aware of 
strong, live arguments against that view.1   
Yet the example of Carneades suggests a problem with this style of teaching. That 
is, it tends to decrease audience confidence and foster skeptical, agnostic attitudes toward 
                                                 
1 The motivations that favor teaching the debate, combined with the forthcoming empirical 
evidence that favors engaging the debate, may make ‘engaged’ team-teaching these 
discussions (e.g. as described by Cray and Brown 2014) a particularly attractive option 
when possible—potentially allowing the best of both models. I thank Michael Cholbi for 
this suggestion.  
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the views presented. The example of Carneades is of course anecdotal evidence, 
insufficient to support the view that teaching the debate leads to agnosticism. But 
contemporary social psychology lends support to the same conclusion. In one of the central 
studies done on so-called attitude strength and disagreement, McGarty and fellow 
researchers (1993) found that the discovery of peer disagreement tends to decrease an 
individual’s confidence in a judgment favoring one of the sides of the disagreement. The 
epistemology of disagreement is currently a hot topic, and I will take no sides here on 
whether a shift in credence upon discovery of peer disagreement is rationally required or 
not. The point is rather an empirical one, though it has epistemic implications.2 Studies on 
disagreement (though limited3) support what anecdotal experience strongly suggests, 
namely that “there is greater certainty about attitudes that the majority either accepts or 
rejects and less certainty about those on which people are divided” (Gross, Holtz, and 
Miller 1995, 226).  
One prominent model for the relevant social effects of disagreement employs 
Festinger’s popular (1957) cognitive-dissonance theory, according to which we are 
motivated to harmonize our recognizably-conflicting beliefs (and attitudes more broadly) 
                                                 
2 In particular, peer disagreement may generate mental state defeaters, even if propositional 
defeat does not occur and belief revision is not rationally required.  
3 One rationale for the limited studies on decreased confidence in the face of disagreement, 
Gross, Holtz, and Miller (1995, 225) suggest, is that the attitudinal changes tend to be short-
lived. For drops in confidence levels tend to motivate us to seek out some related view 
upon which we can be relatively confident.  
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with our actions. Sometimes that means that we change our actions to follow our beliefs, 
but it doesn’t always go that way. Actions can also motivate changes in belief. Although 
much research has focused on intrapersonal sources of cognitive dissonance (Prislin and 
Wood 2014, 684), Festinger (1957, 261–262) also argued that cognitive dissonance can 
arise from social factors, including the recognition of a intra or intergroup disagreement 
(cf. Matz and Wood 2005). In other words, we are typically motivated not just to achieve 
a personal harmony amongst our own beliefs and actions; we are also motivated to achieve 
social harmony in belief and action. The recognition that there’s a disagreement over one 
of our beliefs in turn motivates individuals to come to some social agreement, much the 
same as if the various beliefs were all held concurrently by the same individual (Olson and 
Stone 2014; Jetten, Hogg, and Mullin 2000).  
Given the evidence from social psychology, in the context of a philosophy 
classroom, student discovery of theoretical or concrete disagreement—among not merely 
their peers but also among the ostensible experts whose views are being considered—is not 
plausibly thought to lead individual students to come to unbiased, rational judgments, 
driven by the strongest argument. Discovery of the unresolved debate seems rather to leave 
students largely emptied of their confidence in those areas upon which the debate revolves, 
while at the same time motivated to converge upon a socially-acceptable position if one 
were available. When a majority of students don’t feel confident taking a stand in a debate 
that requires assessing and evaluating various sophisticated philosophical positions, a 
motivation to converge on a socially-acceptable position would naturally lend itself to 
endorsing what might be considered fallback positions. 
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What sort of position requires taking no stand in a complicated debate? 
Agnosticism, and the close cousin I’ve grouped with it, moral relativism. What unites this 
cluster of reactions—agnosticism, relativism, skepticism—is an unwillingness on the part 
of a student to commit (even if tentatively) to the truth of one or more of the views 
presented and debated in the course. Whereas an agnostic or skeptic may deny that we 
know the positions to be true, relativism empties ostensible truth claims of their ordinary, 
non-relative normative and epistemic force. Positions in the debate become more aptly 
described as merely “true” or “false,” for such students. Reactions like these involve a kind 
of attitudinal withdrawal from covered views. Now, given that views like agnosticism and 
relativism also have their respective philosophical defenders, the psychological pressures 
that make teaching the debate favor these attitudes among students may shift somewhat 
when the attitudes themselves are prominently featured as possible positions in the course 
(e.g. in an ethics course that includes debate over moral skepticism, error theory, or non-
cognitivism, among others). That’s not to say that covering the debate over these views 
will make students just as hesitant to endorse relativism or skepticism as any other 
presented view. For sociological research (as well as extensive anecdotal experience) 
suggests that many students come to college already strongly disposed to agnosticism and 
relativism on positions like these (Smith et al. 2011, 27–69).4 Hence, these views are likely 
                                                 
4 Smith and colleagues estimate about one third of contemporary young adults endorse 
moral relativism, and about two thirds endorse various skeptical or agnostic attitudes 
regarding morality (2011, 29). 
9 
 
to remain appealing to students as socially-acceptable fallback positions, even when 
explicitly discussed and debated.5  
Whereas teaching the debate may be motivated by the rationale of displaying a 
model of objective rationality to students (the first motivation above), so that they may 
have an opportunity to form an unbiased judgment on the issues (the second motivation), 
it is more likely that teaching the debate instead leaves students with the impression that 
                                                 
5 Given previous assumptions, it may be rational to have mixed feelings regarding students 
who take a stand in the debate by embracing a sophisticated version of the skeptical 
attitudes mentioned above (e.g. a student who embraces and even argues persuasively in 
favor of moral skepticism or noncognitivism). For on the one hand, this outcome does not 
appear to involve fiducial corrosion, as the student did not (necessarily) lose confidence in 
their relevant beliefs—they are taking a philosophical stand, after all, not withdrawing from 
the debate. But on the other hand, given contemporary sociological research, it is plausible 
to think that a central (albeit potentially unconscious) factor driving the student toward this 
view over others was the combination of nascent, background skeptical attitudes mentioned 
above with the ordinary classroom pressures involved in covering a debate. On this front, 
such students are not unlike those who come to a class with strong, pre-established moral 
views and adopt whatever covered position best accords and explains those views. Both 
sorts of students appear to satisfy the pedagogical desiderata previously detailed, but they 
do so in a way that runs against other common pedagogical desideratum (e.g. that students 
be challenged, or be made to consider more deeply whether the views they come in to the 
classroom are correct).  
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there is no (known) right answer, and the rational attitude is to remain neutral with respect 
to all options. After all, taking up a position of neutrality toward all options is at the heart 
of this style of teaching. And, of course, if a lecturer herself does not take a stand because 
she is ambivalent between her philosophical options, it is plausible to think students may 
detect this ambivalence as no mere posturing and converge the more readily upon a similar 
agnostic attitude. In sum, teaching the debate may satisfy one desiderata assumed at the 
outset, namely imparting to students knowledge of the central theses and arguments taken 
seriously by many contemporary philosophers. But it arguably does so at the expense of 
the other desiderata. That is, we have good reason to believe that teaching the debate is 
reinforcing a preexisting, nascent agnosticism. 
There is an alternative style of teaching, one I argue satisfies both desiderata. We 
can call it ‘engaging the debate.’ If Carneades’s lectures on justice are a paradigm of 
teaching the debate, the Scholastic pedagogical disputatio is a paradigm of engaging the 
debate.6 The essence of engaging the debate is taking an explicit, public stand on the 
positions surveyed in the debate. Of course, one needn’t be an enthusiast. But as the model 
of the disputatio suggests, engaging the debate involves a lecturer personally evaluating 
and assessing the theses and arguments for the class. The same material is covered, 
satisfying the educational desiderata of acquainting students with the central theses and 
                                                 
6 Many contemporary philosophers may be familiar with the style of disputatio as it occurs 
in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, or another prominent medieval philosopher. A more 
complete explanation of the widespread pedagogical (and cultural) use of the technique 
can be found in the work of Alex Novikoff, see among others his (2013; 2012).  
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arguments taken seriously by contemporary philosophers. Teaching and engaging the 
debate thus substantially overlap in content, the material is just framed in a slightly 
different way. Thus, the lecturer does not merely explain Kantianism and arguments for it 
before moving on to discuss criticisms, for instance, she adds that she personally finds 
Kantianism more plausible than rivals and goes on to explain why she finds the arguments 
supporting it more persuasive than the arguments in favor of, say, virtue ethics. When 
discussing criticisms, the lecturer engaging the debate adds why she does not see these 
criticisms as decisive.  
Done well, this engagement is thoughtful and moderate in its tone of argumentation, 
presenting to students a model of how to be both unbiased and committed to a substantive 
philosophical view. The overall impression given by engaging the debate, in contrast to 
merely teaching the debate, is that despite there being a disagreement, it is rational to take 
a stand in the disagreement and to believe there is some knowable, right answer on the 
topics in question. Students are also given insight into how a professional philosopher goes 
about assessing the debate and coming to reasoned conclusions in the face of countervailing 
evidence. The chief difference between a classroom teaching the debate and one engaging 
the debate is that students in the former are left educationally directionless, whereas in the 
latter students are provided with a socially-acceptable alternative to agnostic attitudes, 
namely the professor’s own presented views.  
What we know from psychological research into persuasion implies that engaging 
the debate works better than teaching the debate at satisfying the desiderata of avoiding 
student fiducial corrosion. First, non-experts tend to find experts persuasive, particularly 
when the material the expert is discussing is perceived as complicated (Hafer, Reynolds, 
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and Obertynski 1996). (And the students most disposed to fall back to an agnostic position 
will presumably be those who find the material too complicated to take a personal stand in 
the debate.) This persuasive effect is enhanced when an audience is distracted or tired 
(Petty, Wells, and Brock 1976), as undergraduates tend to be. Moreover, positions that 
appear capable of resisting alternative arguments are seen to be more plausible (Tormala 
and Petty 2004), so a professor who discusses and evaluates arguments contrary to her own 
settled views will give a persuasive advantage to those views. Even when a lecturer is seen 
by students to have low credibility, evidence suggests that over time, students may be prone 
to be persuaded by the views she expresses (Kumkale and Albarracín 2004). 
Research on the efficacy of engaging the debate at persuading students of a 
lecturer’s own view may lend itself to the objection that this style of teaching works too 
well. But there are several mitigating factors in the classroom setting worth mentioning. If 
a student perceives himself to be pressured into accepting a view he does not find plausible, 
he is likely to exhibit a phenomenon known as ‘psychological reactance’ in which he 
deliberately opposes the position he is pressured toward (Brehm 1966). Since a philosophy 
course has presumably equipped students with the tools for engaging a position directly in 
debate, this reactance may express itself in the vocal expression of counterarguments 
(particularly among stronger students), which can have a strong effect in producing 
confidence in the position defended, at least for the student who provides that defense 
(Tormala and Petty 2004; Holland, Verplanken, and van Knippenberg 2003). This 
phenomenon may be the more deeply reinforced if a student believes that others in the class 
have been persuaded otherwise and derives a sense of self-validation in feeling unique from 
the crowd (Clarkson et al. 2013). Moreover, the expression of counterargument may well 
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reinforce the prevailing view that there is no consensus, thereby lowering the degree of 
confidence some students have derived in the professor’s expressed views (McGarty et al. 
1993; Gross, Holtz, and Miller 1995)—although the result of this mitigation is not likely 
to be so strong that it completely eliminates the persuasive effect of a professor’s engaging 
the debate. In sum, an intellectually-regressive dogmatic effect is not to be expected by 
engaging the debate, though one can expect students to feel some pull toward their 
teacher’s views (and thus away from agnostic fallback positions).  
What of the motivations favoring the other model? Arguably, these considerations 
do not so strongly support teaching the debate as they initially appear. First, although 
teaching the debate retains a strong prima facie case for unbiased rationality, it does so by 
modeling rationality as involving impartiality among competing views. Yet, few lecturers 
are in fact impartial among competing views. Instead we often see our professional 
judgments in favor of views as a rational partiality, rather than a potentially-embarrassing 
lapse of objectivity. Some of us may be mistaken in our self-assessment, being subject to 
unconscious biases. Yet it would be reactionary to see in such a possibility grounds for 
feigning impartiality in the classroom—much less giving students the impression that 
rationality involves remaining noncommittal. If anything, the same unconscious biases in 
a lecturer may affect the objectivity of her presentation when merely teaching the debate; 
whereas, if students only knew where a lecturer stood, they would have an easier 
opportunity taking that stance into consideration in their evaluation of what’s presented. 
And although it is possible for some students to be worried about biased grading, if one’s 
engagement is done reflectively and dispassionately, simple verbal reassurances that a 
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student can defend any position in their coursework should be sufficient to ward off real 
anxiety. 
Will engaging the debate cloud a student’s judgment? Here a distinction must be 
made between generally stronger and generally weaker philosophy students—with 
stronger students being understood as those who are more inclined to form an informed, 
independent judgment regarding the material, and weaker students understood as those 
who are generally disinclined to form independent judgments on the material for various 
reasons (including lack of comprehension, caution toward a difficult subject, or 
personality, among others). Given this distinction (and the previously-surveyed evidence), 
stronger students will be those most likely to evaluate the arguments covered in class 
independently of their professor’s own voiced appraisal. It’s true that strong students may 
be more inclined to accept their professor’s views in a classroom engaging the debate than 
otherwise, but this is also rationally appropriate given that the professor is a recognized 
expert from the perspective of the student (in a field where experts are known by the student 
to disagree). In other words, the psychological pressures mentioned above need not be 
construed as fully non-rational or manipulative. That a professor endorses the views that 
she does is defeasible evidence in favor of those views, evidence we should expect rational 
students to take under consideration (and thereby be the more inclined toward) when 
coming to their own conclusions. Rather than clouding a strong student’s judgment, the 
addition of a professor’s voiced views in the classroom is better construed as providing 
more relevant information than would be provided when merely teaching the debate. 
Possessing an inclination to independent judgment, stronger students will also be 
more inclined than their weaker counterparts to think that the professor is wrong, and if so, 
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the evidence suggests that the student is unlikely to be cowed by a professor’s voiced 
position. In other words, this stock of students will tend to find their proverbial voice and 
come to substantive personal views on the course material even in classrooms where a 
professor has engaged the debate. For these students, at least, engaging the debate is 
unlikely to make the weaker argument the stronger, in the student’s mind.  
Weaker students are admittedly the more likely to follow a professor’s voiced 
position for at least partially non-rational reasons. Yet, even here, teaching the debate 
arguably offers no advantage, for at least two reasons. First, these are the same students 
whose judgements are arguably already clouded and directionless in a context of teaching 
the debate by the psychological pressures that favor their attitudinal withdrawal from 
covered positions. Thus, even if we assume that engaging the debate clouds the judgments 
of weak students through non-rational pressure to accept a view, these pressures parallel 
similar non-rational pressures faced in a classroom teaching the debate. What differs are 
the source and the direction of these non-rational pressures, but they predictably appear in 
both teaching contexts.  
Second, as previously mentioned, the professor’s voiced judgment is a rational 
basis for favoring her position. It would thus be excessive to describe a weaker student’s 
coming to share those views on a professor’s say-so a matter of clouded judgment, even if 
the student’s motivations are partially non-rational as well as rational. Even if one were to 
assume weaker students favor their professor’s position more for non-rational than rational 
reasons during the time at which they come to share those views, having once made a 
commitment, they are arguably better positioned to reflect upon the rationality of the 
particular ideas they committed to later in life. Whereas if the debate leaves students 
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perplexed and directionless while the material is fresh in their minds, it would be natural 
for these weaker students to avoid thinking about philosophy altogether as memories of the 
details fade and are consolidated (at best, students will remember such classes as 
“interesting”).  
The last motivation for teaching the debate—namely, that some lecturers do not 
have views they think are sufficiently strong or well-formed for them to feel comfortable 
publicly endorsing them—comprises more of an explanatory than a favoring rationale. It 
does after all seem just as disingenuous to feign endorsement of a philosophical view for 
the sake of avoiding student agnosticism as it does to feign personal non-commitment to 
views in order to avoid the faintest hints of bias. Yet, even here, there is something to be 
said for engaging the debate—at least on those topics where lecturers have commitments. 
For that a professor is willing to commit publicly to some philosophical theses, when 
unwilling to commit to others, is apt to even more genuinely reinforce in a student’s mind 
the fact that rational people do make commitments in the face of what might otherwise 
have appeared to be a perplexing debate. In a classroom where a professor has expressed a 
view on nearly every topic, students may come away from the class thinking that the 
professor is simply opinionated. But in a classroom where a professor is more reserved 
generally, and yet expresses his views occasionally, those occasions on which a view is 
expressed will appear the more sincere and telling in favor of those views. As it is unlikely 
that a lecturer teaches an entire course with no formed views on the covered topics, these 
considerations should at least favor engaging the debate when possible.  
I will now briefly reconsider the rationales that seem to motivate the alternative 
teaching style I’ve here defended before concluding. I have assumed from the outset that 
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one educational desideratum is avoiding fiducial corruption, or the erosion of confidence 
in otherwise rational beliefs. Whereas there are good psychological reasons—given 
contemporary student predispositions toward philosophically agnostic attitudes—to think 
that teaching the debate will tend to produce student agnosticism, engaging the debate can 
be plausibly expected to avoid that negative consequence. Engaging the debate is thus a 
better strategy for satisfying this assumed educational desideratum. And engaging the 
debate does so without sacrificing course content, merely framing that content in a slightly 
different way by including an expression of the lecturer’s own views. Hence, both teaching 
the debate and engaging the debate appear on par when it comes to satisfying the second 
educational desideratum mentioned, namely helping students become knowledgeable on 
the theses and arguments considered central by most contemporary philosophers. Although 
engaging the debate satisfies this second desideratum in a way that will likely incline a 
share of the students toward the teacher’s own views, it is not plausible to think that this is 
pedagogically negative. For research in social psychology suggests that the alternative is 
not that these same students will come to endorse the considered position with the strongest 
argument, but instead that they will walk away from their philosophy class most firmly 
committed to the view that each person is entitled to their own opinion. Such a view needs 
no further reinforcement.7  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 I thank Michael Cholbi and two referees for their very useful comments.  
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